

Do Saving Nudges Cause Borrowing? Evidence from a Mega Study

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Direct policy relevance, specially in light of credit card debt puzzle: co-holding of high interest debt and low interest savings (Sussman and O'brien, 2016; Telyukova, 2013; Haliassos and Reiter, 2005) among others)

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- ▶ Large-scale field experiment (3.1 million subjects) encouraging individuals to save. Main lever: SMS messages
- ▶ Rich panel data of individual credit cards and checking accounts transactions and balances
 - ▶ We measure rolled-over debt (actual borrowing) and not only credit card balances (Beshears et al., 2019; Chetty et al., 2014), as well as spending with credit and debit cards and ATM withdrawals

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- ▶ We provide new facts about the simultaneous holding of high interest debt and low interest savings
- ▶ We uncover significant treatment effect heterogeneity using ML for causal inference

What we do: Overview

- ▶ Focus on individuals whose observable characteristics predict a large treatment effect
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 - ▶ Select customers in the top quartile of the predicted treatment effect distribution (Chernozhukov et al., 2018)
- ▶ Were increased savings accompanied by an increase in borrowing? changes in spending or credit card repayment behavior?

Findings in a nutshell

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- ▶ There are no significant changes in credit card interest –For every \$1 increase in savings, we can rule out a \$0.01 increase in borrowing cost
- ▶ Reduction in spending (measured by ATM withdrawals and card spending)

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- ▶ We find no significant increases in credit card interest
- ▶ No significant increases in credit card repayment following the intervention → saving nudges exacerbated the credit card debt puzzle

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- ▶ No evidence of heterogeneity in borrowing response

Experimental design

- ▶ Field experiment: 3,054,438 customers (374,893 in control group) were sent (bi-)weekly savings messages
- ▶ The intervention lasted 7 weeks in the fall of 2019
- ▶ Encouragements to save were sent via SMS and on ATM screens at the end of a transaction

Experimental pool

- ▶ Random sample from the universe of Banorte customers satisfying the following characteristics:
 1. Had a valid payroll account with Banorte.
 2. Kept an average daily balance of at least 50 MXN over the 2 months previous to the intervention
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- ▶ Experimental pool selected with minimal constraints: can study heterogeneous treatment effects overcoming implicit selection of experimenting only with those for whom the treatment is expected to work (Athey et al., 2021)

Treatment messages

- ▶ Messages about savings more generally
 - ▶ "Congratulations. Your average balance over the last 12 months has been great! Continue to increase your balance and strengthen your savings."
 - ▶ "Join customers your age who already save 10% or more of their income. Commit and increase the balance in your Banorte Account by \$XXX this month."
 - ▶ "Increase your balance this month by \$XXX and reach your dreams. Commit to it. You can do it by saving only 10% of your income."
- ▶ \$XXX is a personalized amount: 10% of monthly income

Treatment messages

- ▶ Messages focused on short-term savings
 - ▶ "The holidays are coming. Commit to saving \$XXX In your Banorte Account and see your wealth grow!"
 - ▶ "Increase the balance in your Banorte Account and get ready today for year-end expenses!"
 - ▶ "Be prepared for an emergency! Commit to leaving 10% more in your account. Don't withdraw all your money on payday."
- ▶ Message alluding to money box and "locking away the money"
 - ▶ "In Banorte you have the safest money box! Increase your account balance by \$XXX this payday and reach your goals."

Aggregate treatment effects

$$Y_i = \alpha_s + \beta * treatment_i + \varepsilon_i$$


Table: Aggregate Effect of the Intervention

| | All Individuals Log of Checking Acct. Balance +1 | Individuals with a Credit Card Log of Checking Acct. Balance +1 | Credit Card Log of Credit Card Interest +1 |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Any treatment | 0.006* (0.004) | 0.014** (0.007) | -0.005 (0.004) |
| Observations | 3054503 | 362223 | 362223 |
| Mean of Dep. Var in Control Group | 17393.63 | 24331.63 | 213.84 |

Method: heterogeneous treatment effects identified by causal forest

- ▶ Causal forest with 2,000 trees: “honest estimation” (Athey et al., 2019).


First with all 161 covariates, and then on the 52 most relevant
Athey and Wager (2019).



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- ▶ Calibration test (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) confirms heterogeneity

Results: treatment effects by quantiles of predicted treatment effects

- ▶ Ranking into quartiles based on cross-fitted predictions over 2 folds.




Figure: Treatment effect on checking account balances, as a function of predicted treatment effects.

Results: saving and borrowing in the top quartile of predicted treatment effects

Table: Treatment Effects on Savings and Credit Card Borrowing

| Dep.Var | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Ln Checking Account Balance +1 | Ln Credit Card Balance (Banorte) +1 | Ln Credit Card Balance (Credit Bureau) +1 | Ln Credit Card Interest +1 | Paid Interest {0,1} | Ln Credit Card Payments +1 |
| Panel A: All Clients with Credit Cards | | | | | | |
| TE | 0.0614*** (0.0137) | -0.0141 (0.0107) | -0.0066 (0.0060) | -0.0145 (0.0353) | -0.0044 (0.0067) | -0.0221 (0.0176) |
| Mean of Dep. Var in Control Group (MXN) N= 126571 | 31,701.61 | 17,119.74 | 43,191.72 | 222.42 | 0.46 | 9,472.50 |
| Panel B: Clients who Paid Credit Card Interest at Baseline | | | | | | |
| TE | 0.0557** (0.0257) | -0.0120 (0.0095) | -0.0085 (0.0057) | -0.0191 (0.0422) | -0.0034 (0.0097) | -0.0286 (0.0213) |
| Mean of Dep. Var in Control Group (MXN) N= 58947 | 23,244.40 | 22,945.46 | 51,401.71 | 410.38 | 0.73 | 7,948.76 |

» Error term

» Prob. interest

» Interest rate

» By message

» Weekly

» Utilization

Results: treatment effects on deposits, ATM withdrawals, and spending (top quartile)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Dep.Var. | Ln Deposits | Ln ATM Withdrawals | Ln Spending with Credit or Debit Card |
| Panel A: Clients With Credit Card | | | |
| TE | -0.0086 (0.0098) | -0.0511*** (0.0101) | -0.0467*** (0.0107) |
| Mean of Dep. Var N=126571 | 28184.53 | 12634.46 | 15615.62 |
| Panel B: Clients With Credit Card Who Paid Interest At Baseline | | | |
| TE | -0.0063 (0.0099) | -0.0712*** (0.0167) | -0.0394*** (0.0107) |
| Mean of Dep. Var N=58947 | 23199.13 | 14008.18 | 21063.06 |

The credit card debt puzzle

- ▶ In our sample:
 - ▶ The average credit card interest rate is 35.2%, and checking accounts pay 0%.
 - ▶ 13.5% of individuals who pay credit card interest keep more than 50% of their income as the minimum balance in their checking accounts over the previous 6 months.
 - ▶ Co-holding costs them 5% of monthly income.

The credit card debt puzzle

- ▶ Several explanations:
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 - ▶ If savings are used to pay-off debt: free up credit limit and with limited self-control catch up on debt effectively spending your savings

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 - ▶ Individuals with limited self control spend up to a certain personal limit on their credit card
 - ▶ If savings are used to pay-off debt: free up credit limit and with limited self-control catch up on debt effectively spending your savings
 - ▶ **Mental accounting: Liquid savings are de-facto illiquid, not available for consumption**

The credit card debt puzzle: responding to a savings nudge

Saving nudges as a shock to patience

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- ▶ Predictions of liquidity management models:
 - ▶ Liquidity needs already covered, open line of credit is cheaper than cash holding → saving through debt repayment
 - ▶ No increases in checking account balances
 - ▶ Reductions in debt

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 - ▶ No increases in checking account balances
 - ▶ Reductions in debt
- ▶ Predictions of mental accounting models:
 - ▶ Shock to preferences of long-term self: repaying debt would lead to increases in spending
 - ▶ Increases in checking account balances
 - ▶ No changes in debt

The credit card debt puzzle: responding to a savings nudge

Saving nudges as exogenous increase in cash balances

- ▶ Predictions of liquidity management models:
 - ▶ New cash holdings are available for future consumption. Consumption smoothing → more debt
- ▶ Predictions of mental accounting models:
 - ▶ New cash holdings not considered in consumption decision → no changes in debt

The credit card debt puzzle: our findings in perspective

39% of individuals carrying credit card debt are in the top quartile of predicted treatment effects:

6% increase in savings, no changes in debt.

Savings: ↑
Debt: -

| | Liquidity Management | Mental Accounting |
|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Shock to patience | Checking - Debt ↓ | Checking ↑ Debt - |
| Shock to cash | Checking ↑ Debt ↑ | Checking ↑ Debt - |

Inconsistent with finding

Consistent with findings

The credit card debt puzzle: our findings in perspective

- ▶ The puzzle group overlaps with the top quartile of predicted treatment effects [▶ Puzzle group](#)

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- ▶ Savings response is uncorrelated with interest rates and with probability of carrying interest ▶ Interest rate → consistent with separate accounts
- ▶ No heterogeneity in borrowing response → borrowing and saving not predicted by same variables

Conclusion


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 - ▶ They don't observe rolled over debt or spending data

Conclusion

- * To the best of our knowledge, only one study looks at saving nudges and credit outcomes (Beshears et al., 2019)
 - ▶ They don't observe rolled over debt or spending data
- * Large scale experiment to jointly study saving and borrowing decisions:
 - ▶ Savings out of nudges are not financed with new debt, but with reductions in consumption
 - ▶ Nudges lead to net increases in savings regardless of pre-existing levels of debt
 - ▶ Suggest that saving and borrowing decisions are processed in different mental accounts.

Results: treatment effects by quantiles of predicted treatment effects

- Differences to the bottom quantiles with Romano Wolf p-values [» Characteristics](#)



(a) Quartiles

(b) Quintiles (top
quartile)

Results: heterogeneity in borrowing

Table: Calibration Test. Causal Forest for Borrowing Heterogeneity

| Models | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Mean Forest Prediction | 1.3702* (0.9114) | 1.1483** (0.6123) | 1.1062* (0.7014) |
| Differential Forest Prediction | -0.2240 (0.2918) | 0.0761 (0.1852) | -0.0495 (0.1975) |

N= 362223

The first model considers all 161 available variables. The second model considers only those with variable importance greater than 1 percent, according to the first model. The third model considers variables with variable importance greater than 1 percent, according to the causal forest for savings (used throughout the paper).

Why causal forest?

- ▶ Causal forests have been successfully applied in the fields of education (Carlana et al., 2022), labor (Davis and Heller, 2020) and development economics (Ashraf et al., 2020)
- ▶ Our paper - one of the first applications in the household finance literature (Burke et al., 2020)
- ▶ In our setting, a substantially larger sample size allow us to use these methods in two novel ways
 - ▶ Powered enough to study treatment effects on sub-populations of interest identified by the causal forest
 - ▶ Able to compare causal forests and other methods for treatment effect heterogeneity based on experimental strata, to illustrate the risk of over-fitting bias

Why causal forest? Sorting without thinking about overfitting leads to biased estimates

Table: Average treatment effects for users in groups with the highest observed average treatment effect and for users with the highest individual treatment effects predicted by the causal forest

| Dep.Var. | Observed Average Treatment Effects | | | | Individual Treatment Effects predicted by Causal Forest | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| | (1) N | (2) Ln Checking Account Balance | (3) Ln Credit Card Interest | (4) Ln Credit Card Balance (Banorte) | (5) N | (6) Ln Checking Account Balance | (7) Ln Credit Card Interest | (8) Ln Credit Card Balance (Banorte) |
| Panel A: All Cientes | 763,511 | | | | | | | |
| ATE | | 0.2401*** (0.0072) | -0.0197*** (0.0037) | -0.0142*** (0.0048) | 763,625 | 0.0220*** (0.0072) | -0.0023 (0.0048) | -0.0019 (0.0041) |
| Mean of dep var (MXN) | | 18283.47 | 66.66463 | 4161.451 | | 21872.15 | | |
| Panel B: Clients with Credit Card | 126,468 | | | | 126,458 | | | |
| ATE | | 0.4403*** (0.0148) | -0.0991*** (0.0095) | -0.1089*** (0.0083) | | 0.0601*** (0.0177) | -0.0171 (0.0334) | -0.0155 (0.0116) |
| Mean of dep var (MXN) | | 21623.82 | 241.41 | 15077.12 | | 31681.46 | 230.39 | 17097.99 |
| Panel C: Clients with Credit Card who paid interest at baseline | 61,204 | | | | 58,485 | | | |
| ATE | | 0.5167*** (0.0114) | -0.1109*** (0.0094) | -0.1946*** (0.0092) | | 0.0567** (0.0251) | -0.0242 (0.0453) | -0.0102 (0.0082) |

Results: characteristics of individuals in top and bottom quartiles

Table: Differences Between Top and Bottom Quartiles of the Distribution of Predicted Treatment Effects

| | Bottom 25% | Top 25% | P-value of Difference |
|--------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------------|
| Age (Years) | 44.18 | 46.35 | 0.0054 |
| Monthly Income | 14,118.44 | 15,109.87 | 0.0000 |
| Tenure (Months) | 74.60 | 88.69 | 0.0000 |
| Checking Account Balance | 16,017.05 | 21,338.30 | 0.0000 |
| Credit Card Balance | 2,435.53 | 6,038.65 | 0.0000 |
| Credit Card Limit | 10,812.16 | 29,933.66 | 0.0000 |

Results: saving and borrowing for individual with low credit line utilization

Table: Treatment Effects on Savings and Credit Card Borrowing for Individuals Below the Median Credit Line Utilization

| Dep.Var | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|--|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Ln Checking Account Balance +1 | Ln Credit Card Balance (Banorte) +1 | Ln Credit Card Balance (Credit Bureau) +1 | Ln Credit Card Interest +1 | Paid Interest {0,1} | Ln Credit Card Payments +1 |
| Panel A: Clients with Credit Line Utilization Lower Than the Median | | | | | | |
| TE | 0.0595*** (0.0230) | 0.0030 (0.0173) | -0.0041 (0.0072) | 0.0035 (0.0495) | 0.0056 (0.0089) | 0.0071 (0.0193) |
| Mean of Dep. Var in Control Group (MXN) N= 63286 | 43,152.85 | 8,701.33 | 19,045.70 | 98.62 | 0.23 | 6,013.95 |


Results: Treatment effects by message

Table: Treatment Effects on Saving and Credit Card Borrowing: Individuals in the Top Quartile of Predicted Treatment Effects who Have a Credit Card [▶ Back](#)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|--------|
| | Ln Checking Account Balance +1 | Increase in Savings (MXN) | Ln Credit Card Interest +1 | Upper Confidence Interval of Credit Card Interest (MXN) | Upper Confidence Interval for Interest Charges Divided by Increase in Savings | N |
| All messages | 0.0601*** (0.0177) | 1904.37 | -0.0171 (0.0336) | 11.12 | 0.006 | 126458 |
| Msg 1 Congratulations | 0.0265 (0.0228) | 839.56 | -0.0055 (0.0336) | 13.90 | 0.017 | 38802 |
| Msg 2 Year end expenses | 0.1170*** (0.0228) | 3705.46 | -0.0183 (0.0336) | 10.96 | 0.003 | 38775 |
| Msg 3 Join others your age | 0.0413* (0.0228) | 1306.86 | -0.0142 (0.0336) | 11.90 | 0.009 | 38822 |
| Msg 4 Money box | 0.0979*** (0.0229) | 3102.57 | -0.0256 (0.0339) | 9.41 | 0.003 | 38700 |
| Msg 5 Reach your dreams | 0.0623*** (0.0237) | 1974.71 | -0.0348 (0.0350) | 7.79 | 0.004 | 38803 |
| Msg 6 Money shortfalls | 0.0338 (0.0253) | 1069.25 | -0.0291 (0.0374) | 10.20 | 0.010 | 38752 |
| Msg 7 Prepared for emergency | 0.042 (0.0298) | 1330.94 | 0.008 (0.0440) | 21.72 | 0.016 | 38590 |


Results: treatment effects on savings and probability of rolling-over credit card debt

Figure: Correlation between the Fraction of Individuals Paying Credit Card Interest and the Treatment Effect of the Intervention on Checking Account Balances. Based on observations in the top 25% of predicted treatment effects, which are further split into deciles.




Results: treatment effects on savings and credit card interest rates

Figure: Correlation between Credit Card Interest Rates and the Treatment Effect of the Intervention on Checking Account Balances. Based on observations in the top 25% of predicted treatment effects, which are further split into deciles of predicted treatment effects.




Results: treatment effects on borrowing and prediction errors

Figure: Correlation between Prediction Errors and Treatment Effects on Borrowing. Based on observations in the top 25% of predicted treatment effects, which are further split into deciles




Distribution of the Puzzle Group by Quartiles of Predicted Treatment

Figure: Distribution of the Puzzle Group by Quartiles of Predicted Treatment Effects



Results: treatment effects on savings week-by-week

Figure: Treatment Effect on Savings by Week, for Individuals with Credit Card who are in the Top Quartile of the Distribution of Predicted Treatment Effects



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