# Fully Closed: Individual Responses to Realized Gains and Losses 

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- individuals reinvest $70 \%$ on average, $80 \%$ in response to a gain and $40 \%$ in response to a loss
- individuals often do not reinvest at all after losses and are more likely to exit stock markets

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## Interpretation and relation to the literature

- Individuals are inattentive and inert:
- Karlssor et al. \{2009), Olaftag and Pagel (2017), Pilias at al. (2010), Awrarex et al. (2012), Ponaparte and Cooper (2011), Caluet et al. (2009a,b), Prumermeier arnd Pagel (2008), Agheut et al. (2003), and Mitchell et al. (2006)



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- Individuals treat realized losses differently from realized gains (and paper losses):
- Thaler and Jahmsor "19gロil, Cowal and Shumbiay \{2005 ), Langer and Mheber (2008), Andrade and lyer (2009), Shiv et al. (2005), Liu et al. (2010), sind Ir7es (2016)



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- Thaler and Johrison \{1990), Coval and Shurfuray (20065), Langer and Wheber (2006), Andrade and lyer (2009), Shiv et al. (2005), Liu et al. (2010), and Imes (2016)
- Individuals learn irrationally from personal experiences
- Malmenclier and Nagel (2011), Arnagol et al. (2015), Anderser et al. (2014), and Kaustia and Kriippfer (2008)



## Data and summary statistics

- All trades and portfolio holdings as well as balances and transactions of settlement, checking, and savings accounts from ${ }^{\sim} 105 \mathrm{~K}$ customers at a German online bank from 2003 to 2016 (plus logins from 2012 onwards)


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- 3,102 (voluntary) trades post announcement, 2,548 individuals
- 32,811 voluntary trades pre announcement, 16,237 individuals


## Summary statistics: closed funds

- Number of mutual funds closures, as identified by the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN)





## Background: fund liquidations

- SPIVA US Scorecard 2017: over 15-year period, $58 \%$ ( $48 \%$ ) of equity (fixed income) funds were merged or liquidated "usually [...] due to continued poor performance"


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- Brown and Goetzmann (1995): US mutual fund disappearance function of lagged relative returns, relative size, expenses, and age
- Bu and Lacey (2009): age, style, returns, expenses, turnover, S\&P 500, and short-term interest rate
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- Evans (2006): total returns more important than risk-adjusted returns
- Could not find significant underperformance in our sample (relative to style class)
- For identification: unlikely investors (can) choose to-be-closed funds


## Summary statistics: all funds

|  | \|77est | mediar | 5tardard deviation | $\begin{gathered} 25 \mathrm{th} \\ \text { Percentile } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 75th } \\ \text { Percentile } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| fund characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |
| retairing | 62\% |  |  |  |  |
| domicile Luxembourg | 62\% |  |  |  |  |
| domicile Germeny | 14\% |  |  |  |  |
| trrget fund | 1\% |  |  |  |  |
| currency Euro | 72\% |  |  |  |  |
| fund age (in months) | 14 | 13 | 7 | 10 | 17 |
| costs and fees |  |  |  |  |  |
| total experise ratio | 1.62\% | 1.72\% | 0.76\% | 1.10\% | 2.03\% |
| initial charge | 2.95\% | 3.50\% | 2.09\% | 0.00\% | 5.00\% |
| armual charge | 1.19\% | 1.25\% | 0.50\% | 0.80\% | 1.50\% |
| asset clasmes |  |  |  |  |  |
| alternatives bonds | $\begin{gathered} 0 \% \\ 17 \% \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| cormodity | 0\% |  |  |  |  |
| equity | 61\% |  |  |  |  |
| balanced | 20\% |  |  |  |  |
| money market | 1\% |  |  |  |  |
| other | 1\% |  |  |  |  |
| fund size before deletion dates (mio Euro) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 mornth | 871 | 41 | 21,000 | 12 | 152 |
| 6 months | 860 | 41 | 19,800 | 12 | 153 |
| 12 months | 838 | 41 | 17,400 | 11 | 152 |
| 24 morths | 907 | 40 | 15,400 | 11 | 150 |
| 46 months | 903 | 42 | 14,100 | 11 | 154 |
| fund returns before deletion dates |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 months | 1.60\% | 4.78\% | 32.26\% | -6.02\% | 16.91\% |
| 12 morths | 2.82\% | 4.93\% | 21.96\% | -2.91\% | 13.97\% |
| 24 months | 4.11\% | 4.81\% | 14.56\% | -0.61\% | 12.07\% |

## Summary statistics: affected funds

|  | \|77esr | mediar | 5tandard deviation | $\begin{gathered} 25 \mathrm{th} \\ \text { Percertile } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 75th } \\ \text { percertile } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| fund characteristics |  |  |  |  |  |
| retairing | 60\% |  |  |  |  |
| domicile Luxembourg | 59\% |  |  |  |  |
| dormicile Germery | 34\% |  |  |  |  |
| target fund | 8\% |  |  |  |  |
| currency Euro | 97\% |  |  |  |  |
| fund age (in months) costs and fees | 15.40 | 14.61 | 6.54 | 10.50 | 18.41 |
| total experme ratio | 1.50\% | 1.40\% | 0.84\% | 0.89\% | 1.92\% |
| initial charge | 3.27\% | 4.00\% | 1.81\% | 2.00\% | 5.00\% |
| armual charge | 1.11\% | 1.10\% | 0.48\% | 0.75\% | 1.50\% |
| asset clasmes |  |  |  |  |  |
| alternatives bonds | $\begin{gathered} 1 \% \\ 19 \% \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| commodity | 1\% |  |  |  |  |
| equity | 43\% |  |  |  |  |
| balanced | 20\% |  |  |  |  |
| money market | 4\% |  |  |  |  |
| other | 11\% |  |  |  |  |
| fund size before deletion dates (mio Euro) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 month | 92 | 18 | 633 | 0.5 | 57 |
| 6 months | 113 | 22 | 805 | 07 | 65 |
| 12 months | 123 | 26 | 845 | 08 | 73 |
| 24 morths | 134 | 31 | 783 | 10 | 84 |
| 46 months | 169 | 36 | 1,130 | 12 | 106 |
| fund returns before deletion dates |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 months | -1.23\% | 1.73\% | 30.75\% | -6.57\% | 10.86\% |
| 12 morths | -0.13\% | 1.97\% | 20.11\% | -3.95\% | 8.89\% |
| 24 months | 1.58\% | 2.29\% | 13.55\% | -2.05\% | 7.37\% |

## Summary statistics: all and affected individuals

|  | m7ear | 5tandard deviation | 10th percertile | $25 \text { th }$ percentile | $\begin{gathered} \text { 50th } \\ \text { Percentile } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 75th } \\ \text { percentile } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { 90th } \\ \text { Percentile } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| all individuals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| male | . 84 | . 37 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| gge | 54 | 13 | 40 | 45 | 52 | 61 | 72 |
| Phワ educated | . 078 | . 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| account age (yrs) | 13 | 3.3 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 14 | 19 |
| risk clars of trades | 4.4 | 1.5 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 5 |
| portfolio value | 55,836 | 129,607 | 7,425 | 16,577 | 33,586 | 62,606 | 111,841 |
| number of sees | 46 | 30 | 8.6 | 20 | 41 | 68 | 92 |
| HH index | . 14 | . 15 | . 0083 | . 037 | . 0905 | . 2 | . 3.5 |
| affected individuals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| trase | . 86 | . 35 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| age | 54 | 13 | 39 | 45 | 52 | 61 | 72 |
| PhD educated | . 088 | . 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| account age (yrs) | 13 | 3.5 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 18 | 19 |
| risk clacr of trades | 4.3 | 1.5 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.9 |
| portfolio value | 65,827 | 118,273 | 8,195 | 18,801 | 38,086 | 74,595 | 131,792 |
| number of secs | 52 | 28 | 15 | 29 | 51 | 74 | 94 |
| HH index | . 12 | . 13 | . 0062 | . 027 | . 075 | . 16 | . 29 |
| affected individusls forced to sell |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| trase | . 84 | . 37 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| age | 53 | 12 | 40 | 45 | 51 | 59 | 68 |
| PhD educated | . 090 | . 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| account age (yrs) | 13 | 3.3 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 19 |
| risk clam of trades | 4.3 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4 | 4.4 | 5 |
| portfolio value | 60,590 | 123,922 | 9,128 | 19,710 | 36,732 | 63,517 | 110,742 |
| number of secs | 51 | 29 | 15 | 27 | 48 | 74 | 96 |
| HH index | . 0909 | . 11 | . 00.53 | . 034 | . 065 | . 14 | . 24 |

## Summary statistics: forced sales

- Number of forced sales, i.e., number of individuals affected by fund closures per year


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## Summary statistics: forced sales

- Forced sales: average amounts liquidated



## Summary statistics: forced sales

|  | 177ear | 5tandard deriation | 10th percerntila | 2!5th percerntile | 50 h percertile | 75th percerntile | 90th percertile |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| holding period before closure (in days) | 969 | 619 | 100 | 361 | 687 | 1,324 | 1,764 |
| purchase share price | 57 | 245 | 24 | 36 | 46 | 56 | 90 |
| forced selling share price | 62 | 224 | 27 | 50 | 50 | 61 | 76 |
| value of forced sell | 7,452 | 11,574 | 468 | 1,456 | 4,027 | 9,691 | 17,68:1 |
| return of furnd investiment | . 21 | . 35 | -. 12 | . 0077 | .13 | . 36 | . 64 |

observations 2,228

## Do individuals notice?

- Individuals are inattentive and inert



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- Individuals are inattentive and inert
- They likely miss the announcement of the fund closure six months in advance (reinvestment behavior similar to deliberate sales)



## Do individuals notice?

- Individuals are inattentive and inert
- They likely miss the announcement of the fund closure six months in advance (reinvestment behavior similar to deliberate sales)
- They probably notice the sale receipt per mail and email



## Do individuals notice?

- Affected funds: announcement effects and sales activity before closures



## Raw data: reinvestment after 30 days

- Forced sales: average percentage reinvested in response to a gain or loss




## Raw data: reinvestment after 30 days

- Forced sales: average percentage reinvested relative to the arithmetic return of the individual fund investments




## Empirical specification

$$
Y_{t, t+\tau}^{i}=\alpha+\beta F_{t j}^{i} \times(f, \text { post }, \text { pre })+\eta S_{j}+\gamma m_{t}+\theta y_{t}+\vartheta w m_{t}+\varepsilon_{t j}^{i}
$$

- Regressors: $F_{t j}^{i}$ liquidation at $t$ of $j$ investor $i$, month, year, week-of-month, and fund fixed effects


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Y_{t, t+\tau}^{i}=\alpha+\beta F_{t j}^{i} \times(f, \text { post }, \text { pre })+\eta S_{j}+\gamma m_{t}+\theta y_{t}+\vartheta w m_{t}+\varepsilon_{t j}^{i}
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- Regressors: $F_{t j}^{i}$ liquidation at $t$ of $j$ investor $i$, month, year, week-of-month, and fund fixed effects
- Outcome variable: $\log Y_{t, t+\tau}^{i}$ flows into portfolio, savings, and checking accounts (or nirwana)


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- Regressors: $F_{t j}^{i}$ liquidation at $t$ of $j$ investor $i$, month, year, week-of-month, and fund fixed effects
- Outcome variable: $\log Y_{t, t+\tau}^{i}$ flows into portfolio, savings, and checking accounts (or nirwana)
- Bandwidths $\tau$ : thirty days since the day that the money arrives in individual's accounts


## Simple cross-sectional results for forced sales

|  | staying in settlement | outflowis into portfolio | outflowns into savings | all other outflowis | outflowis out of bark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation | $\begin{gathered} 0.1437^{* * *} \\ (0.0540) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.6824^{* * *} \\ (0.0937) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.1565 * * * \\ \{0.0583) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0174 \\ (0.0297) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0156 \\ (0.0318) \end{gathered}$ |
| year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| wreek-of-mornth fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| ISIN Ehars and fund age | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations | 2,228 | 2,228 | 2,228 | 2,228 | 2,228 |
| Pe-squared | 0.0471 | 0.2535 | 0.0390 | 0.0107 | 0.0260 |


|  | 5teying <br> in settlement | outflowis into portfolio | outflowins into savings | sll other outflows | outflow out of bark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation | 0.0766* | 0.7869*** | $0.127{ }^{* * *}$ | 0.0093 | -0.0421 |
|  | (0.0463) | (0.0628) | (0.0456) | (0.0265) | (0.0338) |
| liquidation*loss | 0.2393 | -0.3725* | 0.1044 | 0.0288 | 0.0946 |
|  | (0.1483) | (0.2150) | (0.1462) | (0.0717) | (0.0724) |
| year fes month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
|  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| wreck-of-month fes ISIN Ehars | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| ISIN Ehars | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| and furnd age observations | 2,228 | 2,229 | 2,228 | 2,228 | 2,229 |
| R-squared | 0.0616 | 0.2691 | 0.0409 | 0.0111 | 0.0281 |

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## Cross-sectional regression results

|  | 5taying in settlernent | outflows into portfolio | outflowns into sevings | all other outflowrs | outflown out of bark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation*forced | 0.1132 | $0.7314^{* * *}$ | 0.1299** | 0.0254 | -0.0231 |
|  | (0.0930) | (0.0953) | (0.0577) | (0.0445) | (0.0486) |
| liquidation*post | 0.0971 | -0.2496** | 0.0384 | $0.1141^{* *}$ | 0.1044* |
|  | (0.1160) | (0.1189) | (0.0720) | (0.0555) | (0.0606) |
| liquidation*pre | $0.1764 *$ | -0.3532*** | 0.0093 | $0.1675^{* * *}$ | 0.1676 *** |
|  | (0.0947) | (0.0971) | (0.0.688) | (0.0453) | (0.0495) |
| ISIN fes year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
|  | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| wreck-offrnorth fies | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations | 38,141 | 38,141 | 38,141 | 38,141 | 38,141 |
| Pe-squared | 0.0506 | 0.0650 | 0.0678 | 0.0637 | 0.0983 |

## Results with loss interactions

|  | 5tyying in settlernent | outflowns into portfolio | outflows into revings | all other outflowis | outflown out of bark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation*forced | 0.0606 | 0.8543*** | 0.0779 | 0.0070 | -0.0610 |
|  | (0.1047) | (0.1072) | (0.0649) | (0.0500) | (0.0546) |
| liquidatior* post | 0.0997 | -0.2947** | 0.0936 | 0.1012 | 0.1012 |
|  | (0.1301) | (0.1333) | (0.0907) | (0.0621) | (0.0679) |
| liquidation* pre | $0.2621 * *$ | -0.4144*** | 0.0227 | 0.1297** | 0.1458*** |
|  | (0.1057) | (0.1092) | (0.0662) | (0.0509) | (0.0556) |
| liquidation*forced*loss | 0.2015 | -0.4945** | $0.2070 *$ | 0.0761 | 0.1523 |
|  | (0.1887) | (0.1933) | (0.1171) | (0.0901) | (0.0964) |
| liquidation* ${ }^{\text {Post* }}$ loss | 0.1976 | -0.3375** | -0.0038 | 0.1437** | 0.1846** |
|  | (0.1430) | (0.1465) | (0.0967) | (0.0683) | (0.0746) |
| liquidation* ${ }^{\text {Pre* }}$ (oss | -0.1591*** | -0.2994*** | 0.1867*** | 0.2718**** | 0.2884*** |
|  | (0.0428) | (0.0438) | (0.0266) | (0.0204) | (0.0223) |
| ISIN fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| morth fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| wreek-of-month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations | 38,141 | 38,141 | 38,141 | 38,141 | 38,141 |
| R-squared | 0.0511 | 0.0664 | 0.0591 | 0.0682 | 0.0930 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** $\mathrm{P}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{P}<0.1$

## Additional results on risk taking and participation

|  | outflowis*riskclass | reinvestrmert into funds | no reinvestment | participation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation**iskclass*forced | 1.1469*** |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0662) |  |  |  |
| liquidation*riskelass*post | -0.210.5*** |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0752) |  |  |  |
| liquidation* ${ }^{\text {riskclars}}{ }^{*}$ Pre | -0.5144*** |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0675) |  |  |  |
| liquidatior* ${ }^{\text {riskiclass }}$ * forced ${ }^{*}$ locs | -0.4723*** |  |  |  |
|  | (0.1046) |  |  |  |
|  | -0.4037*** |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0617) |  |  |  |
| liquidatiorn* riskclass*pre*loss | -0.0671*** |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0209) |  |  |  |
| liquidation*forced |  | 0.6869*** | 0.1029*** | 0.7758*** |
|  |  | (0.0213) | (0.0192) | (0.04999) |
| liquidation*post |  | -0.0277 | -0.0149 | -0.2023*** |
|  |  | (0.0187) | (0.0169) | (0.0575) |
| liquidation*pre |  | 0.0092 | -0.0.522*** | -0.0690 |
|  |  | (0.0161) | (0.0145) | (0.0505) |
| liquidation*forced*lors |  | -0.2342*** | $0.2246^{* * *}$ | -0.0356** |
|  |  | (0.0263) | (0.0236) | (0.0144) |
|  |  | -0.0839*** | 0.0682*** | 0.0207** |
|  |  | (0.0184) | (0.0166) | (0.0101) |
| liquidation* ${ }^{\text {Pre*loss }}$ |  | -0.0513*** | 0.0299*** | -0.0095*** |
|  |  | (0.0060) | (0.0054) | (0.0033) |
| ISIN fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| morth fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| week-of-month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations | 36,271 | 38,135 | 38,135 | 38,135 |
| Pe-squared | 0.3119 | 0.1115 | 0.1091 | 0.2486 |

## Robustness

- Additional specifications: simple cross-sectional regression

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- Individuals may select into holding on to investment after closure announcement
- Use amount at announcement and loss at announcement as instruments
- Individuals may select into holding on to a losing investment
- Use dummy for holding a loser



## Robustness results

|  | outflowrs partfolia | outflow portfolio | outflowirs portfolio | outflowrs portfolio | outflowis portfolio | outflow portfolio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation | $\begin{gathered} 0.8439 * * * \\ (0.0618) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8222^{* * *} \\ (0.0654) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8196^{* * * *} \\ (0.0627) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8195 * * * * \\ (0.0627) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8197 * * * \\ (0.0627) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| liquidation*loss | $\begin{gathered} -0.5095^{* *} \\ (0.2266) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.4230^{* *} \\ (0.2043) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.4187 * * * \\ (0.1093) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.4187 * * * \\ (0.1994) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.4184^{* *} \\ (0.1993) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| antoumeerment |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.8304 * * * \\ (0.0285) \end{gathered}$ |
| antouncerment*loss |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.3669 * * * \\ (0.0 .576) \end{gathered}$ |
| durmery for invertiment loss | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| fund return over investment portfolio return |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  |  |
| ower fund investment |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  |  |
| three months portfolio return |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |  |
| turelue months portfolio return |  |  |  |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| month fer | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| wreek-of-month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| ISIN chars | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations | 2,228 | 2,228 | 2,222 | 2,227 | 2,227 | 2,227 |
| R-squared | 0.4597 | 0.4532 | 0.4529 | 0.4531 | 0.4532 | 0.4215 |

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## Individuals forced to sell at a gain versus loss

|  | m7ear | 5tandard deviation | $\begin{gathered} 25 \text { th } \\ \text { Percentile } \end{gathered}$ | 50th percentile | $\begin{gathered} \text { 75th } \\ \text { Percentile } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| individuals forced to sell at a gain |  |  |  |  |  |
| risk class of trades | 4.29 | 1.71 | 3.67 | 3.98 | 4.36 |
| awerage holding period (in days) | 790.73 | 585.82 | 296.15 | 686.15 | 1290.00 |
| sum of peper and realized winners at all sale dates | 2266.92 | 13316.89 | 139.50 | 416.50 | 1154.00 |
| sum of paper and realized losers at all sale dates | 1915.89 | 8019.62 | 93.00 | 315.50 | 1067.00 |
| avergge of paper and realized wirniing funds at all sale dates | 24.09 | 37.51 | 5.00 | 12.00 | 27.00 |
| surerge of paper and realized losing funds at all syle dates | 12.00 | 16.50 | 3.00 | 6.00 | 14.00 |
| propensity to realize gioms | 40.49\% | 28.01\% | 16.18\% | 33.82\% | 61.54\% |
| propersity to realize losses | 28.83\% | 25.93\% | 8.84\% | 19.33\% | 42.72\% |
| individuals forced to sell at a loss risk class of portfolio | 3.22 | 1.58 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 5.00 |
| risk class of trades | 4.33 | 1.65 | 3.69 | 4.01 | 4.42 |
| average holding period (in days) | 1129.26 | 653.10 | 618.50 | 1173.50 | 1764.00 |
| sum of paper and realized wifners at all sale dates | 1932.06 | 5829.46 | 93.00 | 370.00 | 1254.00 |
| sum of paper and realized losers at all sale dates | 1953.12 | 6245.63 | 108.00 | 355.50 | 1228.50 |
| average of paper and realized winnting funds at all sale dates | 14.49 | 19.52 | 3.00 | 8.00 | 19.00 |
| awerge of paper and realized losing funds at all sale dates | 11.96 | 15.85 | 3.00 | 7.00 | 14.00 |
| propernity to realize gains | 22.17\% | 20.97\% | 7.53\% | 14.29\% | 30.30\% |
| propersity to realize losses | 20.63\% | 21.12\% | 7.33\% | 13.34\% | 25.00\% |

## Mechanisms and implications

- Rational explanations?
- Insufficient rebalancing and tax considerations: not consistent with treatment of losses


## Mechanisms and implications

- Rational explanations?
- Insufficient rebalancing and tax considerations: not consistent with treatment of losses
- Behavioral explanations? Preferences versus beliefs?
- Prospect theory: realization utility matters (Barberis and Xiong, 2012)
- Mental accounting: differential response to realized rather than paper gains and losses (Imas, 2016)
- Delegation and reverse disposition effects (Koestner et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2016)
- Selective attention: individuals know they lost and choose to not act (Olafsson and Pagel, 2017; Karlsson et al., 2009; Hirshleifer and Welch, 2002)
- Irrational experiential learning (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Anagol et al., 2015)


## How much do individuals consume?

- Estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of stock market wealth:
- Poterba (2000), Гlaris et al. "2001), Гyriar ant Wlaki (2001), Case et al. (2005), and Parker (1909)


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- The marginal propensity to consume out of dividends versus capital gains:
- Raker et al. (2007) and ivlaggio et all. (2017)


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- The marginal propensity to consume out of dividends versus capital gains:
- Paker et al. (2007) and Maggio et all (2017)
- Individuals propensity to consume out of cash inflows:
- Johrisor et al. (20105) Agarnal and Qiar (2014), Olaf5sor arnd Pagel (2016), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000)



## Marginal propensity to consume after 30 days: baseline result

|  | cornumplion | outflows into portfolio | outflonivs into sevings | 5taying in settlement | outflowrs out of bark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation | $\begin{gathered} 0.1059 * * * \\ (0.0295) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.5408^{* * *} \\ (0.0776) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.278 \mathrm{a}^{* *} \\ & (0.1184) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0745 \\ (0.1261) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0050 \\ (0.0300) \end{gathered}$ |
| year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations | 10,742 | 10,742 | 10,742 | 10,742 | 10,742 |
| P-squared | 0.0185 | 0.0659 | 0.0133 | 0.0096 | 0.0067 |

## MPC: recession versus boom

|  | cornsumptior | outflowirs into portfolio | outflows into sevings | 5taying in settlermernt | outflow out of bark |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| liquidation $\times$ ECP recession | $\begin{gathered} 0.0147 \\ (0.0212) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8939 * * * \\ (0.0341) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0816^{* * *} \\ (0.0298) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0098 \\ (0.0171) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0086 \\ (0.0207) \end{gathered}$ |
| liquidation $\times$ boom | $\begin{gathered} 0.1136^{* * *} \\ (0.0386) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.4369 * * * \\ (0.1364) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.5460 * * \\ & (0.2687) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0965 \\ & (0.2742) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0072 \\ (0.0584) \end{gathered}$ |
| year fes month fer | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations R-squared | $\begin{gathered} 9,777 \\ 0.0176 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9,777 \\ 0.1248 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9,777 \\ 0.0142 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9,777 \\ 0.0026 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9,777 \\ 0.0064 \end{gathered}$ |
|  | cornsumption | outflowis into portfolio | outflowivs into sevings | 5taying <br> int settlement | outflows out of bark |
| liquidation <br> $\times$ NPER recession | $\begin{gathered} 0.0153 \\ (0.0213) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.8948^{* * *} \\ (0.0342) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0794^{* * *} \\ (0.0298) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0105 \\ (0.0172) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0098 \\ (0.0208) \end{gathered}$ |
| liquidation $\times$ boom | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1128 * * * \\ & (0.038 .5) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.4367^{* * *} \\ (0.1364) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.5475 * * \\ & (0.2569) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0970 \\ (0.2744) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0083 \\ (0.0583) \end{gathered}$ |
| year fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| month fes | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ | $\checkmark$ |
| observations R-squared | $9,777$ | $9,777$ | $9,77747$ | $9,777$ | $9,777$ |

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** $\mathrm{P}<0.01$, ** $\mathrm{P}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{P}<0.1$
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## Conclusion and open questions

* What's new here?
- Evidence for utility flows in response to realized gains and losses important for understanding investor preferences influenced by experiences
- Evidence for the "realization effect" using observational data


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* What's new here?
- Evidence for utility flows in response to realized gains and losses important for understanding investor preferences influenced by experiences
- Evidence for the "realization effect" using observational data
* We are writing another *macro* paper: just estimating the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of realized capital gains
- Young versus old investors
- High income versus low income investors
- Across the business cycle
- Across interest rate regimes

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[^0]:    Robust 5tardard errors in parerntheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.0.5, * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$

