

State Mandated Financial Education and the Credit Behavior of Young Adults

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent those of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve System, or their staff.

Financial Literacy in the U.S.

Financial Literacy in the U.S. is generally low, but financial knowledge amongst young adults is particularly weak:

- Less than $\frac{1}{3}$ of Americans ages 23 to 28 possess basic knowledge of interest rates, inflation and risk diversification. (Lusardi and Mitchell (2010)).

▶ Big Three Questions

Low Levels of Financial Literacy have been associated with:

- Lower rates of planning for retirement, asset accumulation, stock market participation (Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2014); Lusardi et al. (2010); van Rooij et al. (2012)).
- Greater use of high cost financial services and higher levels of debt (Lusardi and Tufano (2009); Meier and Springer (2010)).

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Policy Response: Financial Education in the U.S.

- After the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers intensified efforts to increase financial literacy in the U.S.
 - One response: Expand K-12 personal finance and economic education requirements.
- Existing body of research on the effectiveness of personal finance education yields conflicting findings at best (Fernandes et al. (2013); Willis (2011)).
- This paper uses a novel approach to independently examine the effect of specific, well-defined personal finance mandates in three states.

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Previous Literature

Paper	Financial Education	Other Education	Sample Age
Brown et al. FRBNY WP (2013)	↑ credit score ↓ CC, auto delinquency	Econ ↑ debt Math ↑ bankruptcy	22-28
Cole et al. HBS WP (2012)	No effect	Math ↓ debt	24-54
Tennyson & Nguyen JCA (2001)	↑ literacy only when tested		HS Students
Bernheim et al. JPubE (2001)	↑ stock participation ↑ asset accumulation	Merges Econ & Personal Finance	30-49

Limitations of Previous Literature

Previous literature often assumes all personal finance education mandates are equal. However...

- Often a lag between mandate passage and implementation in schools (varies by state).
- After passage, some states do not require school districts to actually implement the new curriculum.
- Few states require teacher training on new curriculum.
- Hard to identify financial education effects if other education mandates (e.g. math, economics) change at the same time.

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Limitations of Previous Literature

Studies looking at effects later down the road

- Rely on retrospective survey data (Bernheim et al. (2001)).
- Make long-term assumptions regarding the probability of moving (Cole et al. (2013)).
- Could add noise to the estimates.

Studies that do look at heterogeneity in mandates (Tennyson and Nguyen (2001))

- Use survey data to look at immediate changes in knowledge—not observational differences in outcomes.
- May miss any changes in “attention” or behavior that affect longer-term outcomes.

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Our Contribution

Estimate Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of personal finance education in specific states

- Choose three states with relatively rigorous mandates passed post-2000: GA, ID, TX
- Determine exactly what each mandate entailed: standardized curricula, graduation requirements, teacher training, etc.
- Begin treatment with first class affected by mandate, not following passage of mandate.
- Use synthetic control methods to build proper comparison groups for each treated state.

Question: What are the effects of these specific personal finance education mandates in high school on credit behavior in early adulthood?

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Data Sources

Collect Data on Financial Education Mandates from 2000 to present from:

- Jump\$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy
- Council for Economic Education (CEE) Survey of the States
- Champlain College Center for Financial Literacy
 - In many cases, Jump\$tart and CEE conflict.
 - Heterogeneity and actual implementation (vs. mandate) matter.
- Direct contact with states, graduation requirement documents, standardized curriculum.

Treatment States: GA, ID, TX

- Each state's education program was implemented for graduating class of 2007.
- Each taught Personal Finance in a required HS Economics course.
- Each offered teacher training and a standardized curriculum.
- No other mandated economics, personal finance, or math course requirement changes in the sample period (2000-2013)

State	Length	Testing
Georgia	1 yr	Yes
Idaho	0.5 yr	No
Texas	1 yr	Yes

Control States

Need adequate control states without mandates that did not change their math and economics curriculum in the sample period (2000-2013).



- Solution: Use Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies (Abadie et al. (2010); Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)).
- Collect state-level data in 2000: GDP, Median HH Inc, Poverty Rate, HPI, Unemployment, Education levels, Region, Division, % Private Schools, \$ per Pupil, Race, Ethnicity, Total Education Expenditures.
- Find weights such that treatment states are comprised of one weighted average of potential control states based on pre-period observable characteristics.
- Assume: no contamination (spillovers) in treatment effects.

Synthetic Control State Selection

- Specification (1) GDP, Median Inc, Poverty Rate, HPI, Unemployment, Education, Region, % Private Schools, $\frac{\$}{Pupil}$, Race, Ethnicity, Education \$s
- Specification (2): Specification 1, less GDP (excludes DC)
- Specification (3): Poverty Rate, Unemployment, Education, Region, Division, Percent of Private Schools, % Private Schools, $\frac{\$}{Pupil}$, Race, Ethnicity, Education \$s
- Specification (4): Specification 3 with math scores at grades 4 and 8 (which is a subsample of states)

Treatment and 24 Potential Control States (+ AK & HI)

Legend



Synthetic Controls Selection: GA

Specification Georgia				
State	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
AK	0.03			
AL	0.084	0.056	0.071	0.262
CA	0.021			0.042
CT		0.059	0.013	0.026
DC			0.037	0.027
DE	0.111	0.014		
FL		0.154	0.151	
HI	0.021	0.027		
IN				0.103
KY	0.696	0.681	0.657	0.541
MD	0.037			
MI			0.071	
MN		0.008		

Synthetic Controls Selection: ID, TX


Specification Idaho				
State	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ND	0.441	0.436	0.31	0.64
NE	0.247	0.246	0.12	
OR			0.57	
WA	0.312	0.317		
WY				0.36

Specification Texas				
State	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
AL			0.083	
CA	0.318	0.274	0.02	0.32
KY	0.382	0.34	0.15	0.387
MS	0.3	0.326	0.259	0.294
NM		0.06	0.487	

Treatment and Border Control States

Legend

- Border State-FL
- Treatment-GA
- Border State-MT, WY
- Border State-NM
- Treatment-TX



Consumer Credit Panel Data




Use administrative credit bureau data from the FRBNY/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel (CCP)

- 5% sample of U.S. credit files from Equifax, plus all household members with credit files.
- Panel data collected quarterly.
- Know birth-date, so we assume age 18 = graduation year.
- Not all individuals in sample have credit files at 18, assume HS state = current state.
- Restrict the sample to those 18-22 years of age.




Dependent variables:

- Credit Score; Any account 30, 90+ days delinquent; Auto loan 30, 90+ days delinquent; $\ln(\text{Total debt})$; $\ln(\text{Total CC debt})$

Trends in Dependent Variables: Credit Score



Trends in Dependent Variables: 30 Day Delinquency



Empirical Strategy: Difference-in-Differences

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1(T_s \times P1_{it}) + \beta_2(T_s \times P2_{it}) + \beta_3(T_s \times P3_{it}) \\ + \gamma_1 u_{it} + \delta_s + \kappa X_{it} + \eta_t + \epsilon_{ist}$$

Y_{ist} = credit score, any delinquency, auto delinquency,
= ln(total debt), ln(credit card debt)

T_s = 1 if state was treated

$T_s \times P1, 2, 3_{it}$ = 1 if received education 1, 2, or 3 years following implementation

u_{it} = unemployment rate in the county

n_i = number of quarters of individual's credit file

δ_s = state fixed effects

X_{it} = number of credit accounts for individual i

η_t = quarter by year fixed effects

Synthetic Control Sample Results: GA

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Account 30 Delinquent	(3) Account 90 + Delinquent	(4) Auto 30 Delinquent	(5) Auto 90 + Delinquent	(6) ln(Total Debt)	(7) ln(CC Debt)
P1	4.253*** (1.035)	-0.00326** (0.00139)	-0.00865*** (0.00236)	-0.00320 (0.00194)	0.000970 (0.00160)	-0.0774** (0.0375)	-0.0682** (0.0283)
P2	13.88*** (1.478)	-0.00360*** (0.00101)	-0.0218*** (0.00286)	-0.0109*** (0.00278)	-0.00409*** (0.00143)	-0.0717* (0.0367)	-0.237*** (0.0336)
P3	20.67*** (1.692)	-0.00721*** (0.00112)	-0.0350*** (0.00434)	-0.0196*** (0.00428)	-0.00552* (0.00290)	-0.0339 (0.0374)	-0.344*** (0.0489)
N	3656309	3212753	3212753	645571	645571	2875044	1578714
Means	611.7	0.156	0.179	0.034	0.012	8177.94	998.69

▶ Summary Stats: GA

Synthetic Control Sample Results: ID

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Account 30 Delinquent	(3) Account 90 + Delinquent	(4) Auto 30 Delinquent	(5) Auto 90 + Delinquent	(6) ln(Total Debt)	(7) ln(CC Debt)
P1	-0.725 (1.011)	0.00232 (0.00239)	0.00425* (0.00247)	-0.000236 (0.00258)	-0.00250 (0.00216)	-0.0923** (0.0365)	-0.127*** (0.0442)
P2	7.479*** (1.328)	-0.00241 (0.00230)	-0.0143*** (0.00411)	-0.0130*** (0.00384)	-0.00133 (0.00218)	-0.161*** (0.0433)	-0.168*** (0.0343)
P3	9.510*** (1.550)	0.00117 (0.00208)	-0.0191*** (0.00338)	-0.0142*** (0.00350)	-0.00570** (0.00222)	-0.139*** (0.0414)	-0.208*** (0.0642)
N	661852	584498	584498	129892	129892	529951	275108
Means	635.9	0.110	0.121	0.022	0.007	6966.26	975.76

▶ Summary Stats: ID

Synthetic Control Sample Results: TX

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Account 30 Delinquent	(3) Account 90 + Delinquent	(4) Auto 30 Delinquent	(5) Auto 90 + Delinquent	(6) ln(Total Debt)	(7) ln(CC Debt)
P1	-0.741 (2.134)	0.00168** (0.000706)	-0.00836** (0.00352)	-0.00589*** (0.00146)	0.0000950 (0.00131)	-0.113*** (0.0375)	-0.121*** (0.0228)
P2	6.425** (2.922)	0.00105 (0.00110)	-0.0238*** (0.00425)	-0.00736*** (0.00231)	-0.00286*** (0.00102)	-0.117*** (0.0383)	-0.189*** (0.0262)
P3	12.01*** (3.110)	0.00164 (0.00164)	-0.0337*** (0.00538)	-0.0121*** (0.00225)	-0.00328** (0.00124)	-0.132*** (0.0443)	-0.346*** (0.0427)
N	3917193	3465288	3465288	703938	703938	3048484	1671177
Means	617.1	0.134	0.159	0.032	0.008	8146.32	1005.84

▶ Summary Stats: TX

Border Sample Results: GA

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Account 30 Delinquent	(3) Account 90 + Delinquent	(4) Auto 30 Delinquent	(5) Auto 90 + Delinquent	(6) ln(Total Debt)	(7) ln(CC Debt)
P1	-3.494* (1.979)	-0.000331 (0.000965)	-0.00156 (0.00313)	-0.00105 (0.00214)	0.00293* (0.00169)	-0.0605* (0.0335)	-0.0739** (0.0286)
P2	4.892* (2.824)	-0.0000930 (0.00146)	-0.0130*** (0.00466)	-0.00820*** (0.00286)	-0.00100 (0.00152)	-0.0409 (0.0331)	-0.227*** (0.0340)
P3	10.61*** (2.981)	-0.00340* (0.00178)	-0.0242*** (0.00592)	-0.0180*** (0.00440)	-0.00285 (0.00307)	0.00885 (0.0376)	-0.312*** (0.0512)
N	1533552	1327848	1327848	310320	310320	1184822	632836
Means	609.5	0.158	0.181	0.032	0.011	7030.85	1100.88

Border Sample Results: ID

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Account 30 Delinquent	(3) Account 90 + Delinquent	(4) Auto 30 Delinquent	(5) Auto 90 + Delinquent	(6) ln(Total Debt)	(7) ln(CC Debt)
P1	2.608*** (0.872)	-0.000664 (0.00268)	-0.0000292 (0.00265)	-0.00139 (0.00359)	-0.00248 (0.00212)	-0.0694 (0.0435)	-0.203*** (0.0326)
P2	11.63*** (1.019)	-0.00597** (0.00254)	-0.0200*** (0.00363)	-0.0150*** (0.00333)	-0.00154 (0.00199)	-0.134*** (0.0432)	-0.275*** (0.0320)
P3	14.84*** (1.340)	-0.00330 (0.00220)	-0.0263*** (0.00325)	-0.0162*** (0.00384)	-0.00646*** (0.00166)	-0.126*** (0.0361)	-0.341*** (0.0405)
N	197615	174730	174730	46278	46278	155565	73622
Means	634.9	0.111	0.123	0.022	0.009	6981.26	976.96

Border Sample Results: TX

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Account 30 Delinquent	(3) Account 90 + Delinquent	(4) Auto 30 Delinquent	(5) Auto 90 + Delinquent	(6) ln(Total Debt)	(7) ln(CC Debt)
P1	8.795*** (1.356)	-0.000860 (0.000819)	-0.0202*** (0.00252)	-0.00908*** (0.00162)	-0.00227* (0.00120)	-0.164*** (0.0411)	-0.188*** (0.0194)
P2	17.71*** (1.740)	-0.00201* (0.00106)	-0.0379*** (0.00275)	-0.0112*** (0.00189)	-0.00568*** (0.00117)	-0.179*** (0.0421)	-0.284*** (0.0226)
P3	25.15*** (1.694)	-0.00171 (0.00145)	-0.0503*** (0.00380)	-0.0165*** (0.00205)	-0.00639*** (0.00109)	-0.206*** (0.0424)	-0.466*** (0.0341)
N	1484711	1298845	1298845	284802	284802	1135737	544847
Means	609.6	0.148	0.177	0.032	0.009	8152.94	1007.44

Discussion

- Find evidence that rigorous personal finance education mandates do in fact have an effect on early-life delinquency and credit scores.
- Emphasize that not all state education mandates or personal finance education programs are created equal
- If well done, personal finance education appears to yield significant improvements in financial behavior
- However, estimating the long-run effects of financial education will require further research

Contact







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Big 3 Questions (*Lusardi and Mitchell (2008, 2011)*)

- 1 Suppose you had \$100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow: more than \$102, exactly \$102; less than \$102; do not know; refuse to answer.
- 2 Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1 percent per year and inflation was 2 percent per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy: more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account; do not know; refuse to answer.
- 3 Do you think that the following statement is true or false? "Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund." [true; false; do not know; refuse to answer]

Trends in Other Dependent Variables



▶ Go Back

Summary Statistics: ID

	Control	ID	Border (WY, MT)
Credit Score	638.1212 (80.2629)	632.3341 (85.5644)	637.6713 (78.4124)
Number of Accounts	2.4552 (2.3890)	2.2857 (2.1718)	2.4190 (2.3192)
Account 30 Days Delinquent	0.1115 (0.3147)	0.1079 (0.3102)	0.1148 (0.3188)
Account 90 + Days Delinquent	0.1205 (0.3256)	0.1217 (0.3269)	0.1237 (0.3292)
Auto 30 Days Delinquent	0.0207 (0.1425)	0.0229 (0.1495)	0.0220 (0.1467)
Auto 90 + Days Delinquent	0.0066 (0.0810)	0.0087 (0.0927)	0.0098 (0.0983)
Total Balance on All Accounts	7714.1843 (10603.5315)	6966.2576 (9590.6687)	7966.1582 (10339.9642)
Total Balance on Credit Cards	958.0534 (1805.9279)	1009.2788 (1913.4787)	 (1895.5825)
Number of Individuals	62678	11310	10999

Summary Statistics: TX

	Control	TX	Border (NM)
Credit Score	630.2958 (85.4562)	609.3161 (88.5174)	614.2561 (87.2455)
Number of Accounts	2.3680 (2.3532)	2.3674 (2.4861)	2.2232 (2.1841)
Account 30 Days Delinquent	0.1076 (0.3099)	0.1488 (0.3559)	0.1375 (0.3444)
Account 90 + Days Delinquent	0.1260 (0.3318)	0.1781 (0.3826)	0.1585 (0.3652)
Auto 30 Days Delinquent	0.0311 (0.1735)	0.0323 (0.1768)	0.0297 (0.1698)
Auto 90 + Days Delinquent	0.0078 (0.0879)	0.0084 (0.0911)	0.0110 (0.1043)
Total Balance on All Accounts	6937.2269 (10804.7202)	8146.3205 (11187.0754)	6970.1186 (9517.9630)
Total Balance on Credit Cards	1019.3213 (1913.6340)	1005.8438 (1795.6251)	1794.0825 (1794.0825)
Number of Individuals	270322	153807	12625